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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Moss argued that, in all three cases, the Idaho
Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion
to Augment the record with various transcripts.

Mr. Moss argues that the requested

transcripts are necessary for his appeal because the district court could utilize its own
memory of the prior proceedings when it decided to revoke Mr. Moss' probation.
Mr. Moss also argued, in all three cases, that the district court abused its discretion
when it revoked his probation. 1 Finally, in docket number 38541, Mr. Moss argued that
the district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence pursuant his
oral I.C.R. 35 motion.
In response, the State argues that the requested transcripts cannot be added to
the appellate record because they did not exist prior to the probation violation
disposition hearing and, therefore, the district court did not consider them when it
relinquished jurisdiction and denied his I.C.R. 35 motion. The State also argues that the
requested transcripts are not relevant to the issues on appeal because Mr. Moss cannot
prove that the district court relied on the information discussed at those hearing when it
revoked Mr. Moss' probation.

1

At the probation violation hearing held in docket number 38590 and 38600, Mr. Moss
and his trial counsel both requested that the district court revoke his probation and
impose the underlying sentences. (03/02/11 Tr., p.57, L.13 - p.58, L.21.) Therefore
Mr. Moss' claims that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation and imposed an excessively harsh sentence are both made mindfully of the
doctrine of invited error.
1

This brief is necessary to address the State's characterization of the requested
transcripts as new evidence.

Mr. Moss argues that the requested transcripts are not

new evidence because a district court can rely on its own memory of the prior
proceedings when it considers whether to revoke probation or reduce a sentence.
Since Idaho appellate courts conduct an independent review of the record when
determining

whether

a

district

court

abused

its

discretion

in

regard

to

a

sentencing/probation determination, what the district court actually considered is
irrelevant.

The only questions are whether the information at issue was before the

district court and if it is relevant to the issues on appeal. Mr. Moss also argues that the
State inaccurately represented his behavior leading up to the revocation of his
probation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Moss's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Moss due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Moss' probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Moss'
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, in docket number 38541,
upon revoking his probation? 2

2

This issue will not be further addressed in this brief. Rather, Mr. Moss incorporates
the arguments made in support of issue 2 of this brief.

3

ARGUMENT

I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Moss Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts

Introduction

A.

In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making
sentencing decisions.

Due to triis broad range of information, Idaho appellate courts

have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive appellate record
because they conduct an independent review of the entire record before the district
court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in regard to a
sentencing/probation determination.

In other words, the question on appeal generally

does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered.

Instead, the

central question is whether the record before the court supports its sentencing/probation
determination.
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information before
the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing information
supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of the issue. In
some instances, appeals have been dismissed due to the appellant's failure to provide
transcripts of hearings which occurred years before the disposition of the issue on
appeal.
In this case, Mr. Moss argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process and equal protection when he requested various transcripts necessary to
provide an adequate record for appeal.

In response, the State argues that the

4

requested transcripts are not necessary because the district court did not have those
transcripts when it made the determination to revoke his probation and refused to
reduce his sentence. The State goes as far as arguing that the requested transcripts
would constitute new information on appeal, which cannot be considered by an
appellate court. The State's position is not supported by case law and, if taken to its
logical conclusion, would limit the information a district court could consider because a
transcript of a prior hearing would have to be created before a district court could
consider information from that hearing in regard to a subsequent proceeding.

For

example, without a transcript of a defendant's original sentencing hearing, a district
court could not consider information from that sentencing hearing when determining
whether to grant or deny an I.C.R. 35 motion.

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Moss Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested
Transcripts
An indigent defendant can require the State to pay for an appellate record

including verbatim transcripts of the relevant trial proceedings. However, the State does
not necessarily have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request.

In

order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the
State must provide indigent defendants with a sufficient appellate record to enable a
merit-based review of the issues raised on appeal.

In this case, the Idaho Supreme

Court denied Mr. Moss' requests for transcripts of the Jurisdictional Review Hearing 3
held on February 9, 2010, in docket number 38541, the Probation Violation Hearing

3

This hearing was only entitled "Hearing" in the Appellant's Brief.

p.6.)
5

(Appellant's Brief,

held on September 3, 2009, in docket numbers 38590 and 38600, the Disposition
Hearing held on September 17, 2009, in docket numbers 38590 and 38600, and the
Rider Review Hearing held on February 11, 2010 in all three cases.

That denial

prevents Mr. Moss from adequately addressing the issues raised on appeal. Further, it
could be presumed that the information contained in the missing transcripts supports
the district court's decisions to revoke Mr. Moss' probation and to refuse to reduce his
sentence in docket number 38541.
In response to this position, the State argues that the requested transcripts
pertain to issues over which this Court has no jurisdiction and cannot be considered on
appeal because the "as-yet unprepared transcripts were never presented to the lower
courts in relation to the probation revocation proceedings, they were never part of the
record before the district courts in considering whether to revoke Moss' probation and
are not properly considered for the first time on appeal." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.)
Contrary to the State's position, the question of whether the transcripts of the requested
proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation violation
disposition hearings is not relevant in deciding whether the transcripts are relevant to
the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing or probation decision, a district
court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the proceeding from
which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its
own official position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74

(Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that
the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard
during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could
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rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has
observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein
involved.");

State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing

court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously
dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he
already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings
were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the district court may rely upon the
information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the
decisions to revoke probation and deny Mr. Moss' oral I.C.R. 35 motion.
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable and inconsistent with case law
because all transcripts, except a transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken,
would be deemed new information. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v.
Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (2000), where the district court examined the defendant

about his guilty plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett
failed to provide a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed
that something occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing
decision. Id.
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a transcript of a
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an
appeal is filed from an I.C.R. 35 motion. Further, if that is new information, a district
court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at sentencing when
evaluating an I.C.R. 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 451, 452-453
(Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits of an appeal
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from the denial of an I.C.R. 35 motion because the appellant failed to provide the PSI
and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record.

See also State v.

Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984).
The State's argument is also refuted by State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20
(Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery in 1988
and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the
district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days.

Id.

After completing the period of

retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on probation. Id. Mr. Warren's probation
was then revoked. Id.

Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that his sentence was

excessive. Id. On appeal, Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id.
The Court of Appeals addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the
nature of the probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must
look at the nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where
Warren bit off his victim's ear." ld. 4 However, the Court of Appeals did not address the
merits of his sentencing claim because he failed to provide the original PSI and a
transcript of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the district court's original
sentence was not directly being appealed, and happened years before the decision at
issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript was necessary to address
Mr. Warren's claims of error.

Moreover, there was no indication that the district court

referenced the original sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing.
It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would

4

This is an example of the Idaho Court of Appeals conducting an independent review of
the record.

8

address the nature of the original offense. Had Mr. Moss failed to request the various
transcripts, the State could have argued that his appeal should have been dismissed for
failure to provide an adequate appellate record.
According to the State, Mr. Moss argued, "with no citation whatsoever," due
process and equal protection require the State to "provide him (and all indigent
defendants) with whatever appellate record he desires unless the state proves 'that
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous."' (Respondent's
Brief, p.12 (quoting Appellant's Brief, p.8).) Mr. Moss' burden shifting argument was
based on Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971 ), where the United States
Supreme Court first held that the State does not need to "waste its funds by providing
what is unnecessary for adequate appellate review."

However, the Court went on to

hold that:
We emphasize, however, that the State must provide a full verbatim
record where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an
appeal as would be available to the defendant with resources to pay his
own way. Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make
out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State
to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice
for an effective appeal on those grounds. This rationale underlies our
statement in Draper, 5 that:
'(T)he State could have endeavored to show that a narrative
statement or only a portion of the transcript would be adequate and
available for appellate consideration of petitioners' contentions. The
trial judge would have complied with * **the constitutional mandate
* * * in limitini the grant accordingly on the basis of such a showing
by the State.'
5
6

Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963).
While addressing on the State's argument the Court also noted that:

[This analysis does not include a] balance between the needs of the
accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would
9

Id. (footnote omitted). If it is apparent on the record that there is a colorable need for
the requested transcripts, it is the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts
are irrelevant. Therefore, Mr. Moss' burden shifting position is supported by the case
law referenced by the State.
Based on the Mayer opinion, the State also argues that Mr. Moss has failed to
make the requisite showing that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues on
appeal.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.)

Specifically, the State cites to the Mayer

opinion for the proposition "that absent a showing that evidence was presented at prior
hearings, and/or that the district court relied on such evidence in reaching its decision to
revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to a transcription at public expense .... "
(Respondent's Brief, p.11.) The State then argues that Mr. Moss has failed to how that
the district court relied on anything that occurred during the hearings at issue when
district court revoked Mr. Moss' probation.

(Respondent's Brief, p.12.)

The State's

position is flawed because it engrafts its definition of relevance into the holding from
Maye! and then confuses the applicable standard or review. First, Mayer only requires
that the State provide an indigent defendant access to transcripts if they are generally
relevant to an issue on appeal. That opinion does not attempt to define relevance. It

be available to others able to pay their own way. The invidiousness of the
discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available
only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the
sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal interest is, therefore,
irrelevant.
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196-197.
The State also cites to State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457 (2002). Mr. Moss does not
contest the holding in Strand which limits indigent defendants access to transcripts of
I.C.R. 35 hearings where evidence was presented. (Respondent's Brief, p.11.)
7

10

never states that a transcript is relevant if evidence was adduced at a hearing or if the
district court relied on the hearing.
More importantly, the State's position disregards the applicable standard of
review. When a sentencing/probation determination is at issue on appeal, the appellate
court conducts its own independent review of the record, which is not confined to the
information considered by the district court.

State v. Flores, 131 Idaho 285, 286

(Ct. App. 1998) ("Where an appellant asserts that the sentencing court imposed an
excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record and focus
upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender."); see also State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is

ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record
encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation."

(Emphasis added)).

In

determining whether information is relevant to an appellate court during this review the
only question is whether the information was before the district, 8 not whether the district
court actually relied on that information. This is plenary review.

Therefore, the State's

assertion that Mr. Moss' must prove that the district court relied on information which
was either discussed or presented at the hearings in question is misplaced because it
disregards the applicable standard of review.

8

The information must also relate to a sentencing concern such the nature of the
offense or the defendant's background.

11

Further,

the

State cites

no

authority which

limits

an

appellate court's

sentencing/appellate review to information expressly addressed by the district court. In
many instances an appellate court will not know what the district court relied on in
making a sentencing/probation determination because Idaho courts do not have to
provide any explanation when sentencing a defendant. State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665,
666 (1984).
In sum, Idaho courts consider a very broad range of information when making
sentencing decisions. Due to that broad range of discretion, an appellant must provide
an extensive appellate record in order to challenge all forms of sentencing/probation
determinations on appeal because Idaho appellate courts will presume any missing
information will support the district court's decision. It does not matter what the district
court actually considered, if the information was in the record and is relevant to an issue
on appeal, an appellate court will review that information. In light of the foregoing, the
Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Moss due process and equal protection when it
denied Mr. Moss transcripts of the hearings he will need to overcome this presumption.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Moss' Probation
In its Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that Mr. Moss had access to bipolar
medications, but just decided to not take those medications. (Respondent's Brief, p.23.)
In support of this assertion, the State cited to portions of Mr. Moss' trial counsel's
statements, but omitted key facts, distorting the meaning of those statements.
Specifically, the State wrote:
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Even assuming the truth of Moss' assertion on appeal that his bipolar
disorder contributed to his commission of the underlying offenses, such
does not excuse Moss' multiple failures to abide by the terms of his
probation after Moss received prescriptions for, but failed to take,
medication to resolve his mental health issues. (See 2/8/11 Tr., p.42,
L.22 - p.43, L.3.)
(Respondent's Brief, p.23 (bold emphasis added)). The State leaves the reader with the
impression that Mr. Moss intentionally decided to stop taking his medications, even
though he had access to them and even though they controlled his behavior. This is
misleading. Here is what Mr. Moss' trial counsel actually said at the February, 8, 2011,
probation violation disposition hearing:
And there's clearly something very wrong with him. He's been
diagnosed as bipolar. There's a couple psychological evaluations in the
presentence [materials].

I think the most telling is they said, that if he's not on his
medication, there's a high likelihood of reoffending.
Justin tells me what happened here is he got out of custody. He
He was indigent, and he quit taking
had medications for a while.
medication because he couldn't buy any.
And the evaluations that were in here said that was a recipe for
something to go wrong, and it did.
He goes down to California. I asked him about getting medication
down there. His parents - his mother and his stepfather couldn't help him
at that point. They were going to try to get him back on medication.
He tells me now - Well, he's 25 years old, and the new health care
legislation would enable him to get on his mother's insurance not, at least
for a period of time.
(02/08/11 Tr., p.42, L.19 - p.43, L.13 (emphasis added)).

Contrary to the State's

characterization of the foregoing statements, Mr. Moss had access to his medications,
but stopped taking them because he could not afford them. Mr. Moss did not decide to
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stop taking his medications because he did not feel like taking them. In fact, Mr. Moss
and his parents were trying to get him back on his medications.
Far from being aggravating, the information relied upon actually supports
Mr. Moss' contention that his probation should not have been revoked.

CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Moss

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter to the district court with an
instruction to place him on probation with terms of probation it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, Mr. Moss respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of his
fixed sentence in docket number 38541.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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